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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 08/07/2011

Accident number: 725

Accident time: 09:00

Accident Date: 20/08/2007

Where it occurred: CBU 855, Area 1-001,
Al Hinnieh
Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: 013/07

Country: Lebanon
Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 24/08/2007
Name of source: UN MACC SL

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: M77 submunition

Ground condition: agricultural (recent)
Date last modified: 08/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 0

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
non injurious accident (?)

Accident report
The report of this incident was made available in 2008. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led
to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. The report
is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

BAC INCIDENT REPORT 013/07
Report on Incident that occurred on the 20th August 2007 at CBU 855, Area 1, Al Hinnieh
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The Incident occurred in Area 1 (CBU 855), UTM 706470-3673983 on the 20 August 2007, on
a Completed Site where one M77 Sub-Munition was located inside an orchard.
References:
Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs)
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)
[Demining group] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
[Demining group] Completion Report CBU 855

Introduction
1. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC
SL Programme Manager, Mr [Name removed], Chief of QA MACC SL, issued a Verbal
Convening Order on the 20th August 2007, for an incident investigation independent inquiry.
[Name removed] QA Officer UN MACC SL was to produce this report.
2. This is a report by [Name removed] into the BAC Incident that occurred on the 20 August
2007 which is based on the MACC SL investigation, the [Demining group] completion report:
Date: 20 August 2007
Time of Incident: 9am.
Location: Al Hinnieh Area 1, South Lebanon
Task: CBU-855
UTM of location of the munition: 706470-3673983
Task Start / Finish Date: 16 April 2007 to 27 April 2007
Reported by: [Name removed], QA Officer UNMACC SL.
Reported to: Chief Quality Assurance, MACC SL
Time of Incident report to UNMACC /LMACC
MA Organisation POC: Mr. [Name removed], PM [Demining group]
Investigation Date/Time: 20 August 2007 at 9 am by Sgt [Name removed], team leader LAF
Sampling Team and 21 August 2007 at 7am. by [Name removed], QA Officer
Investigation Location: Task Dossier Area 1-001, CBU - 855
Investigation Team: Sgt Nour El Dine LAF Sampling Team and [Name removed], QA Officer,
MACC SL.
Explosive Ordnance Type: M77 Sub-munition

Background
3. The LAF Sampling Team, was tasked by LMACC on the 17 August 2007 to conduct a
reconnaissance of CBU 855 , Task Dossier, Area 1-001 in order to confirm the CBU turning
points and areas for site setup. It had been identified that [Demining group] had previously
conducted clearance operation on this CBU and a Sampling team were to sample 10% of the
area.
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4. On the 20 Aug 07 the team deployed to CBU 855 in order to setup for BAC sampling
operations. The team leader is Sgt [Name removed] and the QA Officer [Name removed] was
to assist in the team’s operations.
Events leading up to the Incident
5. Team Leader, Sgt [Name removed] was approached by a local worker on BCU 855 on the
20th Aug 2007, around 9am. Sgt [Name removed] was told that a sub munition was found
inside the orchard. Sgt [Name removed] informed LMACC and UNMACC SL. He conducts
an appreciation of the event surrounding the discovery of the sub-munitions and took photos.

[The M77]
BOI Post Incident Activities and General Observations
6. On arrival at the incident site, it was ascertained that there is safe access from the control
point to the incident site without additional clearance being conducted.

[The site]
7. On the inspection of the incident site on the 20 August 2007 the following general
observations were established:
The sub munition was a M77, intact and showed traces of rust on the outer casing
The M77 was located on top of the surface.
The M77 was inside CBU 855.
8. [Name removed] return to CBU 855 on the 21 Aug 07 to confirm the sub munition and to
take photos in order to write this report. The BACTEC EOD team arrived on site and
removed the M77 from the site and was later destroyed.
Geography and Weather
9. CBU 855 is located, with the nearest Town being Al Hinnieh. The land is primarily is used
for agriculture.
Conclusions
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10. Based on the investigation, the documentation and visit to the site, the investigation
concludes the following:
The local worker stated the M77 was found in July 2007 subsurface. The orchard has been
watered since the findings and now found the second time subsurface.
The location of the sub-munitions was identified as in an area that surface clearance had
taken place.
The location of the M77 doesn’t hinder the sampling teams operation.
The BACTEC EOD team will be called out remove or destroy the M77.

Recommendations
11. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:
The Sampling team continues to work on CBU 855 as directed.
Normal site setup is to continue as per SOP.
Signed: [Name removed], QA Officer, UN MACC SL
24 August 2007

Annexes:
A. M77 Site Photos
B. [Demining group] Completion Report (not included)

Comments by the MACC SL Chief of QA: [None]
Comments by the MACC SL Chief of Operations: Seen/Agreed: Seen/Agreed
Comments by the DO Representative: [None]

Analysis
The primary cause of this incident is listed as Inadequate survey because the area had been
tasked for a superficial surface (visual) clearance when at least one submunition had gone
subsurface. The secondary cause is lifted as a Management control inadequacy because the
report makes no recommendation that the MACC SL who allocated the Task should correct
their survey error after finding that it was inappropriate. It is remarkable that the report makes
no recommendations for a secondary, subsurface clearance of an area where a device had
been located subsurface. It is also strange that the investigator decided that the area was
safe to enter and continue a visual Quality Assurance check when fully aware that sensitive
items might be below the surface. The apparent irresponsibility of the management group is
unusual. Because the investigation was carried out by the organization that made the errors,
this incident is listed under Notes as having had “No independent investigation”.
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